Key, Brian (2016) Burden of proof lies with proposer of celestial teapot
hypothesis. Animal Sentience 3(44)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1094

Date of submission: 2016-02-21
Date of acceptance: 2016-02-26

This article has appeared in the journal Animal
Sentience, a peer-reviewed journal on animal
cognition and feeling. It has been made open access,
free for all, by WellBeing International and deposited
in the WBI Studies Repository. For more information,
please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

Animal Sentience 2016.079: Response III to Commentary on Key on Fish Pain

Burden of proof lies with proposer of celestial teapot hypothesis
Response III to Commentary on Key on Fish Pain

Brian Key
School of Biomedical Sciences
The University of Queensland
Abstract: Bertrand Russell famously imagined the existence of a celestial teapot to highlight that
the burden of proof of a hypothesis lay with its proposer and it was not the responsibility of
others to refute it. Those who propose that fish feel pain must bear the burden of proof for their
hypothesis. There are several common arguments adopted by those defending the position that
fish feel pain. For instance, proponents envisage that pain is so important for human survival
that they can’t imagine fish could exist without it. Out of this argument from incredulity emerges
the idea that pain must have evolved early in animal evolution ergo fish feel pain. Fish pain
proponents often accept that fish might feel pain because it seems highly probable that fish do.
Similarly it is reasoned that if fish seem to display multiple human-like characteristics (such as
complex behaviours, learning and tool use), then they must be intelligent and hence make it
more likely than not that they feel pain. It has been argued that those who accept the null
hypothesis that fish do not feel pain are merely cherry picking the literature to refute fish pain.
These claims are levied without understanding that the strength of inferences is heavily
influenced by the robustness of the data and the nature of the results. The fallback position that
fish pain proponents adopt when they accept that the fish forebrain does not generate pain is to
suggest that fish pain arises from somewhere else in the brain using different circuitry. In the
case of the present commentaries the brainstem is recognised as the seat of pain in fish.
Although it is not the responsibility of the non-proposer of this “celestial teapot" to refute it, I
provide evidence that makes continued adoption of this stance untenable.
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Bowers proposes that the question of whether fish feel pain can be answered by a
simple experiment involving an unconditioned stimulus devaluation paradigm. The most
serious flaw in this strategy (as pointed out in the editorial note preceding it) lies in the
fact that it is built on the false premise that an internal representation of an
unconditional stimulus (e.g., electric shock) is necessarily conscious.
Brown falsely argues by “appeal to popularity” that fish most likely feel pain. Such an
approach (also colloquially known as the “bandwagon effect”) is fallacious. Brown
further falls into the trap of the logical fallacy of the “appeal to consequences” by
attempting to suggest that accepting fish do not feel pain means that these animals are
consequently not capable of learning.
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Cooke indicates that the “commentaries are rife with bias and represent a potentially
dangerous form of advocacy.” He recommends that a better way forward is to engage a
learned academic society to undertake an unbiased systematic review of the literature.
However, such an approach is easily tainted by the “appeal to popularity” argument. It is
not unusual for science at the leading edge to be engulfed by controversy and plagued by
deep divisions of opinion. History has shown that with time these issues resolve and the
field moves forward.
Damasio & Damasio argue for fish feeling pain based on four principal reasons. First,
they contend that pain occurs in the brainstem and not the cortex. However, as already
indicated in the target article, one should not uphold motor outputs from the brainstem
as evidence of pain. Second, Damasio & Damasio fail to understand why cortical
stimulation should establish an exclusive role for the cortex in pain. Without reiterating
the evidence already presented in the target article, I will highlight some insightful
experiments conducted in rats that demonstrate the cortical, rather than brainstem,
origin of pain (see references in Key, 2015a).
Rats injected with the chemical irritant formalin into their feet display paw
shaking, licking and grooming, and act to limit contact of the injected foot with the
ground. When these animals are decerebrated they continue to exhibit these behaviours.
A non-critical interpretation of these results is that the animals feel pain at the level of
the brainstem and not the cortex (which is what Damasio & Damasio proclaim).
However, systemic injection of morphine fails to reduce the motor responses in these
decerebrated animals. If pain did arise from the brainstem, then one would predict that
morphine would reduce the sensation and hence the protective behaviours. However,
since the behaviours were not affected, it is unlikely that the brainstem was generating
the sensation of pain. Systemic morphine was active and capable of inhibiting the
behaviours, but only in sham-operated controls in which connections between the
brainstem and forebrain were spared. Thus, the forebrain seems essential for pain-like
behaviours. The role of specific cortical regions was subsequently confirmed when it
was shown that protective behaviours were attenuated by localized injections of
morphine into the cortex. The idea that pain arises in the brainstem is clearly untenable.
Damasio & Damasio’s third conjecture is merely to hypothesise that “some
grade of experience could emerge from complex subcortical nuclei.” The burden of proof
for this hypothesis lies with the authors, particularly given the considerable evidence
contradicting it (Key, 2015a; Key, 2016a). Damasio & Damasio agree with the target
article that pain may persist when a cortical region is damaged because pain involves a
network of cortical regions. Nonetheless, they disregard that supra-brainstem regions
generate pain because there are supposedly few reports in humans of loss of pain with
thalamic damage. However, there is a long history of clinical evidence beginning with
seminal observations by Head and Holmes (1911) — see Craig, 1996, and Price et al.,
2006, for more detailed discussion on this matter — that supra-brainstem regions (i.e.,
thalamus and cortex) produce pain in humans. (I further discuss this point below.)
In their final conclusion, Damasio & Damasio indicate that the insular cortex
does make an important contribution to pain but only by allowing that pain to be
communicated. Damasio & Damasio appear to be defending the position that the cortex
merely communicates the presence of pain while the feeling itself arises in the
brainstem. This line of reasoning can be likened to the suggestion that the conscious
feeling of pain is generated in the spinal cord of paraplegics but it is not verbally
reported as pain because the transmission between the cord and cortex is severed. If
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this was the case, then direct cortical stimulation should not elicit pain (which it can;
Key, 2016a) because communication with the site of pain generation would be lost. It
should be noted that discrete lesions of the thalamus in humans (Hitchcock and Teixeira,
1981; Laitinen, 1988; Hariz and Bergenheim, 1995; Abosch and Lozano, 2004; Weiss et
al., 2005) can produce analgesia, indicating that supra-brainstem regions are
responsible for the feeling of pain. The failure of Damasio & Damasio to recognize the
vast surgical literature on the use of thalamic lesions to relieve pain reveals a level of
bias. Interestingly, in their final sentence Damasio & Damasio once again advocate subforebrain mechanisms by suggesting that feelings may actually arise in the peripheral
nervous system and the enteric nervous system (which is actually part of the peripheral
nervous system). Again the burden of proof lies with Damasio & Damasio to
substantiate such vagarious claims.
Devor, like Damasio & Damasio, is unable to dissociate motor responses generated by
the brainstem from the conscious experience of pain that arises in the cortex. However,
the results from the lesion and morphine experiments on the formalin-model of pain in
rats provide a clear demonstration of this distinction. Devor attempts to paint a picture
that suggests that our understanding of human pain is too rudimentary to allow
inferences to be drawn with regard to fish. To assist the reader, I will succinctly
summarise some major findings arising from over 100 years of clinical and experimental
work that further shines light onto the cortical origins of pain.
The spinothalamic tract is a major ascending axon tract that carries noxious
information from the dorsal horns of the spinal cord to thalamic nuclei. This tract passes
through the brainstem en route to the thalamus. Thalamic fibres then subsequently
course into the cortex. (See Hong et al., 2010, for reconstructions of this pathway in live
human brains.) If the spinothalamic tract is discretely severed anywhere along its length
(or alternatively, if its terminal nuclei in the thamalus are lesioned), it causes analgesia
in humans and other mammals. A recent clinical case report clearly demonstrates that
lesioning the spinothalamic tract provides immediate relief of pain (Ivanishvili et al.,
2016). If pain was arising from the brainstem, then selective severing of the
spinothalamic tract above the brainstem should not affect pain. In these experiments the
brainstem remains intact as do connections between the brainstem and the thalamus
and cortex. This refutes the claim by Damasio & Damasio that the cortex is merely a
conduit for the communication of pain. One cannot then suggest that noxious
information passes via the spinothalamic tract to the thalamus and then to the
brainstem (and the loss of the spinothalamic tract would hence prevent noxious stimuli
from reaching the brainstem). It should be pointed out that there is a separate
spinoreticular pathway that also carries noxious information from the spinal cord to the
brainstem (Willis, 1985). Thus, the results of severing the spinothalamic tract provide an
additional line of evidence that refutes the idea that the brainstem is the generator of
pain.
Devor claims that because the cerebellum can become active during pain one
would expect the cerebellum to be directly involved in pain. However, he then dismisses
this because electrical stimulation of the cerebellum does not produce pain. It is well
known that the cerebellum is activated by noxious stimulation via a spino-bulbarcerebellar pathway and that this allows regulation of motor behaviour in response to
noxious stimuli (Huma et al., 2015). Devor has inadvertently highlighted the fact that
direct electrical stimulation is an additional test for the involvement of the cortex in
pain.
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Devor proposes that the human cortex is a modifier of pain rather than a
generator. This hypothesis predicts that direct stimulation of the cortex will not produce
pain. He cites numerous examples where stimulation of the cortex fails to cause pain.
These are negative results that lead to weak inferences because it can be difficult to
ascertain whether the lack of positive results (i.e., pain) was due to problems with the
experimental procedure (e.g., difficulty in stimulating the pain circuitry). However, once
a positive result is obtained the hypothesis is immediately falsified (this is a strong
inference). One is reminded of the analogy that “all swans are white” but once a black
swan is found then the hypothesis is not supported.
Given that pain has repeatedly been shown to be experienced following direct
cortical stimulation (the reader is encouraged to view the video of a patient’s response
to direct cortical stimulation, which is available as supplementary online material in
Mazzola et al., 2012), we are justified in strongly inferring that the cortex is not merely a
modifier. One can then propose and test the hypothesis that the cortex is the generator
of pain. A prediction of this hypothesis is that the ablation of appropriate cortical regions
should lead to a perturbed experience of pain. Positive results have been reported for
this experiment and hence we have further support for the inference that the cortex is
the generator of pain. By ignoring the positive responses and only accepting the negative
outcomes Devor is trapped by cognitive bias. This line of thinking causes him to neglect
the rodent work (see Key, 2016a) that further indicates that the cortex is the generator
of pain.
Diggles concurs with Derbyshire in calling attention to the mischievous use of the term
“pain” to describe the reaction of fish to noxious stimuli. He further highlights issues of
fish welfare that are not dealt with by the notion of fish pain.
Edelman points out that “structural and functional similarities to the vertebrate
hippocampus have been noted in the neural circuitry subserving memory in certain
insects.” It is not clear what Edelman is suggesting here given that this statement (if
true) is supportive of my line of reasoning. He extends his discussion by raising the
structural similarities of the eye in octopi and in vertebrates. I also raised similarities in
the structure of olfactory glomeruli as well as pattern generators across species to
highlight how structure determines function (Key, 2016a). The conclusion by Edelman
is then a contradictory statement that “pain perception in bony fish might have been
initiated via circuitry distinct from the mammalian pathways.” The burden of proof lies
with Edelman and it must be stronger and more convincing than “might have been
initiated” to reject the null hypothesis that fish do not feel pain. (This harks back to the
celestial teapot hypothesis.)
Merker reiterates his idea that the tectal-periaqueductal complex (part of the
brainstem) “might house the circuitry through which nocifensive behaviour is attended
by pain.” As I said above, the burden of proof for a hypothesis calls for more evidence
than that the brainstem “might house” the circuitry. I have already discussed some
additional literature that further demonstrates that pain is not generated in the
brainstem. However, it is noteworthy that Merker has restricted his argument to the
notion that the brainstem is controlling the motor behaviours rather than the pain per
se. Merker queries whether the neuroanatomy of the bird pallium is consistent with my
four — not 21 as imagined by Merker — principal neuroanatomical criteria. He
questions lamination because it seems to be missing in birds. To save space and so as not
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to seem to be ignoring these comments, I refer Merker to the original papers on the bird
pallium (as discussed in Key, 2015a) in order that he better understands this matter.
Merker claims that I made “an astonishing misreading of the cited study” when I
suggested that Yager et al. (1977) had shown that tectal ablation does not affect escape
responses to touch. On page 271 of the Yager et al. paper, they report that tectumless
fish exhibited “an exaggerated startle” (i.e., avoidance or escape) “response when they
were touched with the net.” So not only do tectumless fish continue to respond to touch
as I stated, but they also actually exhibit a heightened response. Merker inappropriately
claims, using the fact that “visually conditioned … breathing responses to electric shock
are abolished” (Yager et al., 1977) in tectumless fish, that the tectum is therefore
involved in feeling the electric shock. However, these results merely demonstrate that
the tectum was necessary for perception of the conditioning light stimulus. Merker’s
misjudgement in this case is due to his not fully comprehending the technical approach.
Yager et al. did not assess the role of reinforcing electric shock on visual performance
after tectal ablation. A follow-up study by Davis and Klinger (1987) (that should have
been cited in Key, 2016a) addresses this matter. Using the same experimental method
as Yager et al., Davis and Klinger showed that tectumless fish still responded to electric
shock. They revealed that an electric shock was needed to reinforce spatial
discrimination by both sham-operated control fish and tectumless fish. Thus, tectumless
fish can still respond to electric shock, meaning that the tectum is not directly involved
in nociception (and certainly not pain). Merker now needs to “budge” and provide some
substantial evidence to support his hypothesis that the tectal-periaqueductal complex
“might house” the necessary circuitry for pain in fish.
Merker attacks my citing Lovejoy and Krauzlis (2010) regarding lack of evidence
that the tectum contributes to conscious awareness. Merker proclaims that there is not
one word about conscious awareness in this paper. (That turns out to be precisely the
point I am making.) The primate superior colliculus is involved not only in the motor
control of eye saccades, but also in the selection of the appropriate target in the visual
field where the saccades will direct attention. Lovejoy and Krauzlis show that attention
can be directed toward an object in the visual field without an eye saccade (i.e., gaze) to
that object (so-called covert attention). While previous studies have shown that the
cortex is involved in covert attention, there has been no evidence that the superior
colliculus is involved. Lovejoy and Krauzlis provide that evidence. However, there is still
no evidence, as yet, to indicate that the superior colliculus is directly responsible for
conscious awareness of the target in the absence of the cortex. It should be noted that
the Lovejoy and Krauzlis citation was introduced as part of a response to a previous
commentary from Merker and was not discussed in the target article (Key, 2016a). The
burden of proof for Merker’s hypothesis still remains and that proof needs to be
considerably more convincing than attempts to undermine the appropriateness of two
cited references.
Safina provides a series of anecdotes, just-so stories, engages in anthropomorphism and
mixes in a series of fallacious arguments (such as argument from incredulity) to
superficially defend fish pain. I have discussed most of these issues before (Key, 2015b;
Key, 2016a; Key, 2016b; Key, 2016c) but Safina does raise a novel twist by questioning
why some fishes have defensive spines if their predators don’t feel pain. This question
emerges from the anthropomorphic tendency to think that fish can only avoid an object
if they feel it. (I discussed avoidance learning in the absence of conscious awareness in
Key, 2016a.) Safina then questions why a stingray’s spine would also evolve venom, if
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not to produce pain. I remind the reader that noxious stimuli can work via direct local
lesions (such as a stingray barb) as well as by venom that spreads more widely through
tissue extracellular fluid and the lymph system (and thereby activates a larger tissue
mass). Venom and barbs are two different noxious stimuli for activating the nervous
system.
Walters refreshingly applies the structure-function approach to squid. However, there
is a danger in using this approach across distant lineages that possess anatomically
incongruous nervous systems. While I don’t have the space here to argue for, or against,
every animal model, I do ask that the argument go beyond black box analogies. A
reasonable attempt should, at least, first identify where in the squid nervous system pain
is supposedly generated and second, describe how that circuitry is consistent with the
neural processing underlying pain. I accept that the size of the brain is not important but
that rather the neural tissue should possess the necessary neuroanatomy to be capable
of being aware of its own neural activity and to experience it as pain (or by any other
name that it is camouflaged as, e.g., “raw experience”).
Walters argues that squid have their own pain that is a “raw experience” and
proposes that, as such, it does not require the sophisticated circuitry of mammals.
However, the fundamental notion of pain, as opposed to nociception, is the awareness of
the stimulation as something “that it feels like.” To put this in colloquial terms, “feelings
must be felt.” It is this “what it feels like” that requires a specific type of
neurocytoarchitecture and interconnectivity. Walters claims that because many animal
nervous systems contain networks and circuits that could be associated with signal
amplification and global integration, then they “may experience forms of conscious
pain.” Interestingly, Walters did not sufficiently elaborate on the nature and
whereabouts of these circuits. In an attempt to adjust the structure-function argument
from vertebrates to invertebrates Walters has drastically oversimplified the approach.
He has inappropriately reduced the necessary fundamental properties to the simple
requirement for coordinated widespread activity of neurons.
Walters calls for the use of conditioned place preference paradigms to
demonstrate pain in fish and invertebrates. However, as previously discussed (Key,
2016c) this experimental approach is not insightful. Walters, like many other
commentators (Key, 2016b), is guilty of using just-so stories. He imagines squid to have
awareness of arm injury and as a result of this ability they are proposed to be able to
realize that they are more vulnerable to predators. As a consequence, they choose to
maintain normal activities to bring less attention to themselves.
The fact that Walters talks of “motivational states triggered by noxious stimuli”
leads him to accept, inadvertently and prematurely, that the behaviours involve
conscious awareness (that is: state A is motivational; motivation requires conscious
awareness of goals; noxious stimuli cause state A; therefore, animal in state A is
conscious). An entirely different interpretation would result if the state were instead
referred to as a “motor output.” Notably, other invertebrate researchers are more
discerning about interpreting nocifensive behaviours in cephalopods and warn that they
do not demonstrate pain-like states (Alupay et al., 2014).
Making sense of the senses. Some commentators seem concerned that accepting that
fish do not feel pain has slippery-slope consequences. If fish do not feel pain, then
perhaps they do not experience other sensory stimuli either. While this logic is
understandable, what seems to be more troublesome for them is that fish may
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consequently be labelled as “zombie-like” or robotic. Putting such slippery-slope
arguments aside, is it possible that fish do not consciously experience the colour red [i.e.,
that they are not feeling anything at all when they are receiving or responding to optical
input]? It is not my intent to fully address this question here, as it will no doubt lead us
too far from the primary topic of fish pain. However, given the interest in the general
question I will briefly describe several key experimental results that should challenge
readers to think more deeply about the issue.
1. It is uncontroversial that humans require the primary visual cortex (V1) to be
aware of objects in their visual field. However, about 100 years ago it was realised that
some World War I soldiers that were blinded by shrapnel injury to their occipital lobes
(where V1 is located) were still able to somehow perceive the presence of moving
objects (Riddoch, 1917). Subsequently, some individuals have been reported to navigate
corridors littered with obstacles despite being blind. Some patients can also guess the
presence of moving objects without being consciously aware of their presence. This
nonconscious visual ability is referred to as blindsight (Weiskrantz et al., 1974). It seems
that a neural pathway from the thalamus to middle temporal lobe (that bypasses V1;
Barbeben et al., 2014), that is not accessible to conscious awareness, is responsible for
this residual visual ability. What this means is that visual behaviour in humans is not
totally dependent on conscious experience. The association between conscious
experience and behaviour, which many people seem to intuitively think is mandatory, is
not necessarily essential. Blind individuals can exhibit behavioural responses to objects
in their visual field without consciously seeing (experiencing) them. This begs the
question as to whether nonhuman animals could possibly do the same.
2. When the primary visual cortex has been injured in monkeys and rodents,
these animals can also demonstrate nonconscious vision (Weiskrantz, 1996; Carey et al.,
1990).
3. Toads can duck, turn away and avoid objects when their forebrains have been
completely removed (Ewert, 1970).
4. Now what about fish? Fish swim and feed normally following removal of their
entire forebrain. They can catch pellets of fish food without a forebrain. They can swim
and flee to avoid capture with a fishnet without a forebrain. They can also respond to
light signals during avoidance learning paradigms without a forebrain. Clearly fish
demonstrate some remarkable nonconscious visual abilities. These results strongly
support the idea that it is not necessary for fish to consciously experience sensory
stimuli (whether noxious electric shocks or coloured objects) in order to respond
behaviourally to them. One may retort by saying that the seat of all conscious experience
lies below the level of the forebrain. But I will leave this up to the reader to think
through carefully, especially now that we better understand the feedforward reflex-like
pathways in the brainstem that drive behaviours such as prey recognition in zebrafish
(e.g., Bianco and Engert, 2015).
As already noted, I do not describe the above results in detail but merely present
them here to provoke and challenge researchers to think critically about how they
intuitively respond to anecdotal observations of animal behaviour.
Some commentators raise questions about the evolutionary significance of pain
in humans and other mammals. It seems inconceivable to some people that fish could
survive for more than 400 million years without conscious experience of noxious
stimuli. This question is a derivative of a much larger question about the purpose of
consciousness itself. “Why” questions are always controversial; books and journals are
full of discussions on why phenomenal consciousness [i.e., sentience] exists. One thing is
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certain: understanding the evolutionary (as well as developmental) origins of conscious
awareness of noxious stimuli will bring us closer to deciphering its neural basis and
perhaps also to appreciating its functional significance.
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